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An objective corruption risk index using public procurement 
data 
 
Abstract 
In order to address the lack of reliable indicators of corruption, this article develops a 
composite indicator of high-level institutionalised corruption through a novel ‘Big Data’ 
approach. Using publicly available electronic public procurement records in Hungary, we 
identify “red flags” in the public procurement process and link them to restricted competition 
and recurrent contract award to the same company. We use this method to create a 
corruption indicator at contract level that can be aggregated to the level of individual 
organizations, sectors, regions and countries. Because electronic public procurement data is 
available in virtually all developed countries from about the mid-2000s, this method can 
generate a corruption index based on objective data that is consistent over time and across 
countries. We demonstrate the validity of the corruption risk index by showing that firms with 
higher corruption risk score had relatively higher profitability, higher ratio of contract value to 
initial estimated price, greater likelihood of politicians managing or owning them, and greater 
likelihood of registration in tax havens, than firms with lower scores on the index. In the 
conclusion we discuss the uses of this data for academic research, investigative journalists, 
civil society groups, and small and medium business. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Various corruption indices have received considerable academic, policy, and media 
attention, at least partially due to the central role the underlying phenomena play in 
the quality of democratic governance, the provision of public goods, economic 
growth, and equality. Some international organisations regularly monitor corruption in 
their member countries (European Commission, 2011) while many donor agencies 
tie funding to performance on governance indicators including corruption (Andersson 
and Heywood, 2009; Radelet, 2002, 2003). 
In the absence of robust ‘objective’ measures, there are three major sources of 
corruption indicators to date: 1) surveys of corruption perceptions and attitudes 
(which are most widely used); 2) reviews of institutional and legal frameworks; and 3) 
detailed analyses and audits of individual cases. Each of these has deficiencies 
leaving us without any reasonably reliable and valid indicator of corruption suitable 
for comparing countries over time or exploring within country diversity. If these 
indices are not valid and reliable, and are instead contaminated by past economic 
performance (so that “successful” countries are rated as less corrupt) then their use 
to inform aid disbursement is not only problematic but risks producing the perverse 
results of denying funding to countries that need it most (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007b).  
In order to fill some of the gap between the demand for reliable and valid corruption 
indices and the state of the data currently available, the goal of this paper is to 
develop a novel measure of institutionalised grand corruption which: 1) rests on a 
thorough understanding of the corrupt rent extraction process; 2).solely derives from 
objective data describing behaviour; 3) allows for consistent temporal comparisons 
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within and across countries, and 4) can be replicated for many countries using pre-
existing data. Such high standards of indicator building are met using a novel ‘Big 
Data’ approach. 
We develop a measure of grand corruption in public procurement.1 In public 
procurement institutionalised grand corruption refers to the allocation and 
performance of public procurement contracts by bending prior explicit rules and 
principles of good public procurement in order to benefit a closed network while 
denying access to all others (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009; 
Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). 
The paper is structured as follows: first, the literature on corruption measurement is 
reviewed; second, the proposed novel measurement approach is presented; third, 
Hungarian data and variables are summarized; fourth, the composite corruption risk 
index (CRI) is constructed; fifth, we discuss validity.  Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of possible applications. 
2. LITERATURE ON MEASURING GRAND 
CORRUPTION 
Available indicators of corruption are either flawed or too narrow for testing theories 
of grand corruption and developing effective solutions to it. By and large, corruption 
indicators derive from: (1) Surveys of attitudes, perceptions and experiences of 
corruption among different stakeholders (e.g. general population, firms, experts); (2) 
                                               
1
 Other types of grand corruption can be found in privatization, altering regulation, large scale 
smuggling operations, etc. Public procurement is arguably one of the most important types as for 
example it amounts to roughly one third of public spending in OECD countries.   
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Reviews of institutional features controlling corruption in countries or individual 
organisations; and (3) Audits and investigations of individual cases. 
Among perception and attitude surveys, the two most widely used are the World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Mastruzzi, and Kraay, 2010) and 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency 
International, 2012a). Both of these have received extensive criticism applicable to 
any similar survey (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Lambsdorff, 2006). Critics point 
out that perceptions may or may not be related to actual experience (Rose and 
Peiffer, 2012). They can be driven by general sentiment reflecting, for example, prior 
economic growth (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a, 2007b) or media coverage of high profile 
corruption cases (Golden and Picci, 2005). Arguably, perceptions of grand corruption 
are even more unreliable than perceptions of everyday corruption since experts and 
citizens have almost no direct experience of this type of corruption. Furthermore, 
these indicators are produced from non-representative surveys, therefore 
representativeness bias is likely to occur (i.e. capturing the views of a particular 
group rather than the whole population), in addition to reflexivity bias (i.e. 
respondents influenced by prior and future measurements) exaggerated by small 
sample sizes (Golden and Picci, 2005). In addition, these indicators vary surprisingly 
little over time even when large changes in underlying governance structures occure 
suggesting that they are too insensitive to change (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2011). Surveys of experiences with low-level bribery, such as the Quality of 
Government Institute’s regional survey  (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente, 2010), 
address some of the weaknesses of perception surveys, but fall short of a sufficient 
data source also. One major problem is non-response or false response to sensitive 
questions such as giving or receiving bribes. Most importantly, only a tiny fraction of 
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the population has direct experience with grand corruption limiting the use of this 
method. 
Reviews of institutions controlling corruption (e.g. OECD, 2009; Transparency 
International, 2012b), while crucial in understanding the determinants of corruption, 
are, by design, not measuring corruption directly. In the absence of a precisely 
measured outcome variable, they have to rely on untested theories on which 
institutional features work.  
Scientific analyses and audits of individual cases are highly reliable in establishing 
both petty and grand corruption, however, their narrow scope make them of only 
limited use for comparative purposes. In addition, data from courts and law 
enforcement agencies can be used to create indices of corruption only to a limited 
degree because courts and law enforcement agencies have little capacity to 
investigate large number of cases and there is a high risk of capture in corrupt 
countries. 
2.1 Objective measures of corruption 
Some authors, recognising the deficiencies of the above indicators, developed 
objective measures which rely on directly observable indicators of behaviour that 
likely indicate corrupt behaviour (for an overview see Annex A). These studies 
investigate corruption in various contexts such as elections and high level politics or 
welfare services and redistributive programs. For example, Olken (2007) uses 
independent engineers to review road projects and calculates the amount and value 
of missing inputs to determine corruption. These indicators are very narrow, and 
would be very expensive to generate over time and across space which represents 
their key weakness compared to surveys of corruption perceptions. In an ideal 
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scenario scalable objective indicators and surveys of corruption experiences are 
combined to provide a fuller picture of the hidden and diverse phenomena.  
More closely associated with our approach are those studies which focus on 
corruption in public procurement and bidding markets. For example, Golden and 
Picci (2005) propose a new measure of corruption based on the difference between 
the quantity of infrastructure and public spending on it among 20 regions in Italy.2 
Our index is inspired by other authors that use red-flags in public procurement 
records as proxy measures for corruption. These include the use of exceptional 
procedure types (Auriol, Flochel, and Straub, 2011) or clear scoring rules (Hyytinen, 
Lundberg, and Toivanen, 2008) or political connections of winning companies 
(Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013).  
While these papers inspired our approach and point in the right direction, they 
cannot be scaled up to allow for temporal comparisons across countries and 
organisations. The reason is that they rely on a single indicator which may or may 
not be the primary vehicle for corrupt rent extraction depending on the regulatory 
framework in place (Olken and Pande, 2012). For example, corruption linked to 
exceptional procedure types may be easily removed by simply deleting the 
procedure from the procurement law. However it is unlikely that this alone would 
change the underlying corrupt phenomena much, as this technique can be replaced 
by another method of restricting competition (Auriol et al., 2011). Instead of relying 
on a single indicator, these and further elementary indicators have to be combined 
for meaningful temporal and international comparisons. 
                                               
2
 It would be extremely difficult to use this method in a large cross-national framework, because it 
requires detailed knowledge of the cost of constructing public works across regions within a country 
(Golden and Picci 2005: 43), It is also restricted to construction, so could not be used to measure 
corruption in other sectors. Moreover, it is not appropriate for time-series data, as it “is not a measure 
of the flow of corrupt transactions.” (Ibid: 43).   
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3. THE MEASUREMENT APPROACH 
3.1 Corrupt rent extraction in public procurement 
In order to indirectly measure institutionalised grand corruption, its underlying logic 
must be contrasted with a competitive market logic. Institutionalised grand 
corruption’s primary aim is earning corruption rents. Corruption rents in public 
procurement can be earned when the winning contractor is a pre-selected company 
which earns extra profit due to higher than market price for the delivered quantity 
and/or quality. 
The winning company has to be pre-selected in order to control rent extraction in an 
institutionalised manner. This rules out occasional dishonesty where the company is 
lured into corruption during the public procurement process. Extra profit has to be 
realised in order to create the pot of money from which rents can be paid. 
In order to measure extra profit; price, delivered quantity, and quality of deliveries 
has to be known with high precision. However, none of these three can adequately 
be measured. Price and quantity are publicly available, but they are comparable only 
for homogenous products such as electricity without laborious case-by-case analysis 
and even then it is difficult to arrive at accurate estimates. Quality cannot be reliably 
observed in official records without using expensive expert knowledge. Hence, we 
can only analyse the process of awarding contracts to pre-selected companies. 
Competition has to be eliminated or tilted in order to award the contract to the pre-
selected company. Bypassing competition can be done in three primary forms, each 
corresponding to a phase of the public procurement process: 1) limiting the set of 
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bidders (submission phase); 2) unfairly assessing bidders (assessment phase); and 
3) ex-post modifying conditions of performance3 (delivery phase). 
On the one hand, these three elementary corruption strategies can be combined in 
any way to reach the final desired outcome. For example, some bidders may be 
excluded with a tightly tailored eligibility criteria while the remaining unwanted 
bidders can simply be unfairly scored on subjective scoring items. On the other 
hand, once the desired outcome has been achieved at a given stage, there is no 
need for further corrupt actions that would increase the risk of detection with no 
additional benefit. For example, if the only company submitting a valid bid is the pre-
selected company there is no need to modify contract content later to increase price. 
3.2 Measurement model 
Utilizing a public procurement database it is possible to measure a host of 
elementary indicators in relation to each of the above three stages of public 
procurement from which a composite indicator can be built. In order to most 
adequately model the company selection process, measurement is carried out on 
the level of individual contract awards. Aggregation to organisation level can also be 
carried out to link procurement data to company or bureaucratic characteristics. 
Likely outcomes of corrupt procurement procedures are defined for each of the 
above three main phases (see section 5.1). Indicators of likely corruption techniques 
to achieve these outcomes in each phase are also defined, which constitute the 
inputs for corrupt contract award and completion (see Authors, 2013a). 
                                               
3
 While modifying contract conditions does not belong to the set of company selection techniques, it 
can be part of an arsenal supporting the selection of the ‘right’ company. For example, the pre-
selected company wins in a competitive process by promising low price and high quality knowing that 
later contract modifications will allow it to earn the agreed corruption rent. 
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The corrupt contract award process is modelled using multiple regression linking 
likely corruption inputs (e.g. eligibility criteria tailored to one company) to likely 
corruption outcomes (e.g. only one company submitting a bid) while controlling for 
alternative explanations (e.g. number of competitors on the market). Our models 
linking corrupt inputs to outcomes in public procurement directly follow from the 
definition of institutionalised grand corruption. Hence, they explain recurrent contract 
award to a pre-selected company with those corruption techniques that typically 
serve as means for corruptly eliminating competitors. Given that the theoretical 
model postulates that both inputs and outputs of the corruption process as organised 
by the corrupt network, no causal claim is made based on the models, even though 
temporal sequence of inputs and outputs could lend some support to a causal 
interpretation. 
The explanatory model linking corruption inputs to outcomes delivers a set of 
coefficients that represent the strength of association (not causal impact!) between 
each underlying likely corruption input and likely corruption outcome. Reliability of 
elementary corruption indicators is defined using their regression coefficients, as 
those corruption inputs which are more powerful in predicting probable corruption 
outcomes are more likely to signal corruption rather than noise. Falsely indicating 
corruption is minimised by dropping those indicators which didn’t prove to be 
powerful and significant predictors in the model and assigning lower component 
weights to those whose effect is only moderate.  
Likely corrupt outcomes, having no regression coefficients, receive a weight of 1 
reflecting their benchmark status in modelling the corruption process. Based on our 
knowledge of corruption practices, likely corruption outcomes measure most directly 
the underlying corrupt transactions hence their benchmark status. Every powerful-
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enough corruption input receives a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting the size of its 
regression coefficient and our theoretical understanding of how corruption inputs 
lead to outcomes. This means that all weights are scaled compared to likely 
corruption outcomes. For more on weighting see section 6.1. 
For comparison across time and countries, both the list of components and 
component weights should be kept constant unless there are differences in the 
regulatory framework or types of corrupt practices warranting any deviation. This is 
because some corruption inputs may be unused in some countries and periods while 
widely used in others. Giving different weights balances the validity of the composite 
indicator within its context with keeping measurement consistent across time and 
countries; a balancing act which is easiest if regulations and typical forms of corrupt 
practices are very similar. As corruption techniques can substitute for each other, the 
different component weights reflect institutional features impacting on the form but 
not the substance of institutionalised grand corruption (For details of a comparative 
appplication of this index see Authors, 2013c). This implies conducting laborious 
calculations for fitting this approach to each context such as country, following the 
approach set out for Hungary. 
Using the weights obtained from the measurement model, elementary indicators are 
simply summed to produce the corruption risk composite indicator of individual 
transactions (CRI). Summation reflects the view that different combinations of 
elementary corruption techniques can equally render a contract corrupt; while 
multiple signs of corruption indicate higher corruption risks. As sophisticated actors 
can achieve corrupt control of a tender even with recourse to a single corruption 
technique implies that CRI is only a lower bound estimate of ‘true’ corruption, a 
significant limitation. CRI is defined as follows: 
 11 
 CRIi = Σj wj * CIj 
i  (1) 
 Σj wj = 1 (2) 
 0 ≤ CRIi ≤ 1 (3) 
 0 ≤ CIj
i ≤ 1 (4) 
where CRIi stands for the corruption risk index of contract i, CIj 
i represents the jth 
elementary corruption indicator observed in the tender of contract i, and wj 
represents the weight of elementary corruption indicator j. Elementary corruption 
indicators can be either corruption inputs or outputs. 
Higher level units’ such as organisations’ CRI can be obtained by calculating the 
arithmetic average of their transactions’ CRI in a given period (it is also possible to 
use contract values for weighting). An added value of aggregating CRI to a higher 
unit of observation such as an issuer of tenders is that it further increases our 
confidence in CRI. An organisation consistently displaying high CRI is likely to be a 
corrupt organisation rather than simply a victim of random fluctuations in the data. 
 
4. DATA 
The database derives from Hungarian public procurement announcements of 2009-
2012 (this database is referred to as PP henceforth). The data represent a complete 
database of all public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public 
Procurement Law. PP contains variables appearing in 1) calls for tenders, 2) contract 
award notices, 3) contract modification notices, 4) contract completion 
announcements, and 5) administrative corrections notices. As not all of these kinds 
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of announcements appear for each procedure, for example depending on procedure 
type, we only have the variables deriving from contract award notices consistently 
across every procedure. Comparable datasets exist or can be constructed from 
public records in most developed countries including every EU member state, 
Russia, and the US at least since 2008 (for examples see Annex B). 
The place of publication of these documents is the Public Procurement Bulletin 
which is accessible online4. As there is no readily available database, we used a 
crawler algorithm5 to capture the text of every announcement. Then, applying a 
complex automatic and manual text mining strategy, we created a structured 
database that contains variables with clear meaning and well-defined categories. As 
the original texts available online contain a range of errors, inconsistencies, and 
omissions, we applied several correction measures to arrive at a database of 
sufficient quality for scientific research. For a full description of database 
development, see Authors (2012a) in Hungarian and in somewhat less detail Authors 
(2012b) in English. 
A potential limitation of our database is that it only contains information on public 
procurement procedures under the Hungarian Public Procurement Law as there is 
no central depository of other contracts. The law defines the minimum estimated 
contract value for its application depending on the type of announcing body and the 
kind of products or services to be procured (for example, from 1 January 2012, 
classical issuers have to follow the national regulations if they procure services for 
more than 8 million HUF or 27 thousand EUR). By implication, PP is a biased 
sample of total Hungarian public procurement of the period, containing only the 
                                               
4
 See: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/nid/KE (in Hungarian) 
5
 For a gentle introduction see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_crawler  
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larger and more heavily regulated cases. This bias makes PP well suited for studying 
more costly and more high stakes corruption where coverage is close to complete. In 
spite of any such limitations, the scale of data available is daunting, over 53,000 
contracts awarded worth over 11 billion EUR, amounting to over 3% of total GDP 
between 2009-2012. 
5. BUILDING BLOCKS: THE CORRUPTION 
PROCESS’ OUTCOMES AND INPUTS 
5.1 Indicators of corruption outcomes 
The selection of “red-flags” to be included in our composite corruption risk index was 
informed by a comprehensive review of the literature and fieldwork in Hungary with 
people familiar with corruption in public procurement. This included 14 interviews 
with officials, contractors, and procurement advisors conducted in 2012-2013.  This 
fieldwork yielded a large list of potential “red-flags”. Our indicator includes 13 of 
these “red-flags” that are predictive of likely corrupt outcomes in regression analysis.  
In order to minimize the odds that our “red-flags” are indicating incompetence, 
inexperience, or unusual procurement markets, we restrict our analysis to 
competitive markets and experienced tenderers.  
The key outcome of institutionalised corruption in public procurement is recurrently 
awarding contracts to a pre-selected company. We use three outcome indicators to 
match this corrupt outcome as closely as possible (see Table 1). First, the lack of 
competition during the bid submission phase is indicated by a single bid submitted 
as it allows the public officials to award the contract at a higher than market price. 
Second, during the assessment phase excluding all the ‘unwanted’ bidders leads to 
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a very similar non-competitive outcome. Hence, we use the exclusion of all but one 
received bids as an indication of a potentially corrupt outcome. Finally, in order to 
capture the recurrent award of contracts to the same company, we use the winner’s share 
within the issuer’s contracts as an indication of a corrupt tendering outcome. If corruption is 
institutionalised it is likely to lead to a high market concentration further underpinning the 
view that competition is tilted to the advantage of connected bidders. 
Table 1. Summary of outcome indicators 
phase indicator name Definition 
submission single bidder 1=1 bid received, 0=more than 1 bid received 
assessment exclusion of bids 1=1 bid NOT excluded, 0=more than1 bid NOT excluded 
overall 
winner’s share of issuer’s 
contracts 
Previous 12-month total contract value of winner / 12-month 
total awarded contract value (by issuer) 
 
5.1.1 Single bidder 
Issuers of tenders are free to choose the bidder of their preference; however, they 
are mandated to maximise value for money, most importantly through soliciting 
competing bids. Corruption arises when competition is blocked in order to earn a 
corruption rent. The most obvious signal that there was absolutely no competition for 
a public contract is when a tender received only one bid (Amaral, Saussier, & 
Yvrande-Billon, 2009). Interview evidence from Hungary suggests that tenders with 
only 2-3 bids are also highly likely to be prone to corruption, as one public 
procurement adviser working in the industry for over a decade put it: “it is easy, just 
bring two friends with whom we can agree on the exact content of their bids”. 
Focusing only on single bidder contracts is, therefore, a conservative approach in 
line with the goal of delivering a lower bound estimate of large-scale corruption.  
There are two potential criticisms to this indicator: 1) The single bidder indicator also 
signals corruption in cases when there was truly only one bidder capable of 
performing the task, but no corruption took place. While this is a serious weakness of 
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the indicator, it is considered to be only of marginal magnitude as the overwhelming 
majority of products procured by governments are ordinary and widely produced 
such as office stationery, cars, national roads, or IT support services (less than 5 
percent of contracts were awarded on markets with 3 or fewer companies). 2) Some 
authors contend that a single bidder has no incentive to give a bribe (Soreide, 2002). 
However, in an environment of systemic corruption, a single bidder tender is the 
ideal outcome created by colluding bidders and issuers, especially if the same single 
bidder wins contracts repeatedly (see section 5.1.3). 
5.1.2 Exclusion of all but one bidder 
It is possible that a corrupt issuer didn’t manage to deter all but one bidder from 
submitting a bid, in which case it can still award the contract to the ‘well-connected’ 
bidder if it manages 1) to exclude the bids of all unwanted bidders on administrative 
or formal grounds (Heggstad and Froystad, 2011); or 2) to unfairly assess the bids to 
favour a particular bidder. As there is no data in public records for the latter, the 
assessment phase’s corruption outcome indicator captures only the former. Having a 
single valid bid tender is heavily associated with corruption for the same reasons as 
for single submitted bid. This similarity between the two measures, is also supported 
by regression results. 
5.1.3 Winner’s share of issuer’s contracts 
While there is no separate indicator for the delivery phase, we develop a likely 
corruption outcome measure for the public procurement corruption process as a 
whole. The ultimate goal of large-scale institutionalised corruption is to repeatedly 
award contracts to the same company or companies controlled by the corrupt group 
(Heggstad and Froystad, 2011). By implication, winner’s share of issuer’s previous 
contracts indicates the likelihood of such corruption. As the primary location of 
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collusion and capture is the individual public organisation disbursing public funds, 
this variable is defined as the ratio of contract value the winner won from a given 
issuer to the total value of contracts awarded by the given issuer throughout the 12-
month period prior to the tender being analysed.  
Using winner’s share within issuer’s contracts (or winner’s contract share as we will 
call it to remain succinct) as  a corruption indicator is likely to suffer from 
disturbances in periods when a new dominant group takes control of public 
organisations with its new clients, for example when a new government comes into 
office. Changes of dominant, captor groups are expected to be rare events, hence, 
this downward bias may only be moderate (and controlling for year of contract award 
in the below regressions captures much of this potential bias). Moreover, this 
indicator also underestimates corruption when the corrupt network uses multiple 
companies for extracting rents such as multiple companies owned by one group or 
independent companies orchestrating their bids. 
5.2 Indicators of corruption inputs 
These (likely) corrupt outcomes described above are achieved through a variety of 
corruption “inputs” or techniques to eliminate competitors. The international literature 
and interviews in Hungary revealed 30 such techniques which could be reliably 
calculated using publicly available public procurement records (see Authors 2013a). 
However, we only retained 14 of them for the composite index building as these 
turned out to be significant and substantial predictors of all three outcome variables 
in regression analyses, suggesting fit with a corrupt rent extraction logic. 
Table 2 summarizes the 14 corruption input factors included in our composite 
corruption risk index (descriptive statistics in Annex C).  Some of the variables are 
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continuous, and we had to determine thresholds over/under which we considered 
them a “red-flag.” We describe this process of determining thresholds below.  
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Table 2. Summary of corruption inputs (higher score indicates greater likelihood of corruption) 
phase indicator name indicator definition 
submission 
Single bidder contract* 
0=more than one bid received  
1=ONE bid received 
Call for tender not published in 
official journal 
0=call for tender published in official journal 
1=NO call for tenders published in official journal 
Procedure type 
0 =open procedure 
1=invitation procedure 
2=negotiation procedure 
3=other procedures (e.g. competitive dialogue) 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 
Relative length of eligibility 
criteria 
number of characters of the eligibility criteria MINUS 
average number of characters of the given market's 
eligibility criteria 
Length of submission period 
number of days between publication of call for 
tenders and submission deadline 
Relative price of tender 
documentation 
price of tender documentation DIVIDED BY contract 
value 
Call for tenders modification 
0=call for tenders NOT modified 
1=call for tenders modified 
assessment 
Exclusion of all but one bid 
0=at least two bids NOT excluded  
1=all but one bid excluded 
Weight of non-price evaluation 
criteria 
proportion of NON-price related evaluation criteria 
within all criteria 
Annulled procedure re-launched 
subsequently** 
0=contract awarded in a NON-annulled procedure  
1=contract awarded in procedure annulled, but re-
launched 
Length of decision period 
number of working days between submission 
deadline and announcing contract award 
delivery 
Contract modification 
0=contract NOT modified during delivery  
1=contract modified during delivery 
Contract lengthening 
relative contract extension (days of extension/days 
of contract length) 
Contract value increase 
relative contract price increase (change in contract 
value/original, contracted contract value) 
* The single bidder indicator is simultaneously an outcome of the submission phase and an input to the 
assessment phase. 
** Combining annulations by the issuer and the courts 
Table 3 describes the logic linking corruption inputs to corruption outputs (for more 
details see [Authors 2013a]). Single received bid and single valid bid outcomes are 
discussed jointly because the theoretical considerations are very similar and the 
regressions reveal largely the same findings.  
The expectations are formulated in a general linear form. For example, the shorter 
the submission period is the more likely that only one bid was received. However, 
many of the continuous variables are indeed not a continuous measure of corruption 
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risks, rather there are critical thresholds beyond which corruption risks greatly 
increase. For example, a submission period of 5 days compared to 15 days is likely 
to convey higher corruption risks while a submission period of 35 days compared to 
45 days may carry little to no information regarding corruption. By implication, behind 
any of our linear hypotheses lies the expectation of finding the thresholds which best 
capture spikes in the probability of a corruption outcome hence corruption risks. 
In every case, the input variables are defined in a way that their higher values are 
expected to signal higher corruption risks. However, some of the corruption inputs 
are typically used as ‘corrective action’ later on in the procurement process to fix the 
failed attempts at bending competition earlier. These factors are expected to have 
negative association with corruption outcomes of earlier stages. For example, if only 
the well-connected company submitted a bid there is no need for subsequently 
modifying the contract as the corrupt bidder could set the price and quality allowing 
for corrupt rent extraction. However, if there was real competition at the submission 
phase the well-connected bidder is likely to be forced to submit a competitive bid 
with little scope for earning extra profit; hence the need for subsequent contract 
modification. 
6. REGRESSION SPECIFICATIONS 
This section discusses the regressions modelling institutionalised grand corruption in 
public procurement and derives component weights for composite indicator building..  
The regressions’ primary purpose is to determine whether a red-flag should be 
included into the composite index, as well as its weight in the index. As stated above, 
only those indicators that predict a single bid or exclusion of all but one bid and/or 
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the winner’s share of issuer’s contract in the previous 12 months, are included into 
the index. We also use the size of the regression coefficients to determine the weight 
of the technique in the index, since we want those techniques that are the greatest 
predictors of corruption outcomes to have a higher weight. Adopting this method will 
facilitate cross-national comparisons, as different techniques will be utilized 
differentially in various institutional settings. The regressions also provide the primary 
source of internal validity of the composite indicator. For outcomes single received 
bid and single valid bid, we used binary logistic regression; while for the winner’s 
contract share outcome, we used linear regression. 
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Table 3. Summary of the expected direction of and grounds for the relationships between corruption inputs and outputs 
Phase INPUT/OUTPUT 
single received / valid bid winner’s share within issuer’s contracts 
direction Reason direction reason 
Submis-
sion 
Single bidder contract 
not 
relevant 
not relevant + 
Single received bid contracts make it easier for issuers to repeatedly 
award contracts to the same well-connected company. 
Call for tender not 
published in official 
journal 
+ 
Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal makes it less 
likely that eligible bidders notice the bidding opportunity and bid. + 
Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal weakens 
competition allowing the issuer to more easily award contracts 
repeatedly to a well-connected company. 
Procedure type + 
Non-open procedures, which are less transparent and require less open 
competition, create more opportunities to limit the range of bids received 
and to exclude bids. 
+ 
Non-open procedures, which are less transparent and require less open 
competition, create more opportunities for issuers to repeatedly award 
contracts to the same well-connected company. 
Relative length of 
eligibility criteria + 
Lengthy, hence complex, eligibility criteria allows issuers to tailor the 
tender to a single company and to exclude unwanted bids. + 
Lengthy, hence complex, eligibility criteria allows issuers to benefit a 
well-connected company, for example by keeping less competitive 
bidders in competition. 
Short submission 
period + 
A short submission period leaves less time hence make it harder for 
non-connected companies to bid and to submit a bid. + 
A short submission period leaves less time hence make it harder for 
non-connected companies to bid successfully whereas a well-connected 
firm can use its inside knowledge to win repeatedly. 
Relative price of 
documentation + 
Relatively expensive tender documentation makes bidding more 
expensive and hence deters bidders from bidding except for the well-
connected company which is close to certain of its success. 
+ 
Relatively pricey tender documentation weakens competition allowing 
the issuer to more easily award contracts repeatedly to a well-connected 
company. 
Call for tenders 
modification + 
Modifying call for tenders allows for excluding unwanted bidders by 
changing eligibility criteria once the interested bidders are known. + 
Strategic modification of the call for tenders favours the well-connected 
company further increasing its market share. 
Assess-
ment 
Exclusion of all but 
one bid 
not 
relevant 
not relevant + 
Single valid bid contracts make it easier for issuers to repeatedly award 
contracts to the same well-connected company. 
Weight of non-price 
evaluation criteria + 
Non-price related evaluation criteria tend to be more subjective, allowing 
issuers to favour the well-connected company. Apparently unfair 
assessment criteria deters bidders. 
+ 
Non-price related evaluation criteria tend to be more subjective, allowing 
issuers to favour the well-connected company, hence repeatedly 
awarding contracts to the same company. 
Annulled procedure 
re-launched 
subsequently* 
- 
If unwanted bidders couldn't be deterred from bidding and their bids 
couldn't be excluded, annulling and subsequently re-launching the 
tender allows issuer to correct its failed attempt to eliminate competition. 
+ 
If unwanted bidders couldn't be deterred from bidding and their bids 
couldn't be excluded, annulling and subsequently re-launching the 
tender allows issuer to more successfully award the contract to a well-
connected company. 
Length of decision 
period + 
Overly lengthy decision period signals extensive legal challenges to the 
tender, suggesting that the issuer attempted to limit competition. + 
Lengthy decision periods signal extensive legal challenge to the tender, 
suggesting that the issuer wants to award the contract to a well-
connected company. 
Delivery 
Contract modification - 
If competition couldn't be eliminated, the well-connected firm can still 
win with a competitive offer, but subsequent contract modification(s) still 
allow it to collect extra profit. 
+ 
Contract modification(s) suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-
connected company, potentially repeatedly. 
Contract lengthening - 
If competition couldn't be eliminated, the well-connected firm can still 
win with a competitive offer, but subsequent contract lengthening still 
allows it to collect extra profit. 
+ 
A contract lengthening suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-
connected company, potentially  repeatedly. 
Contract value 
increase - 
If competition couldn't be eliminated, the well-connected firm can still 
win with a competitive offer, but subsequent contract value increase still 
allows it to collect extra profit. 
+ 
A contract value increase suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a 
well-connected company, potentially  repeatedly. 
 
The regressions are also used to account for non-linearity in the indicators of 
corruption inputs, that is identifying indicator values beyond which corruption risks 
considerably increase or jump. Hence, one value range was identified for each 
continuous corruption input which could be deemed in line with a market or 
economic logic; furthermore, at least one other value range was defined which was 
considered as an outlier compared to the prevailing market norm while also being 
strongly associated with the likely corruption outcomes This approach led to a 
definition of red flags which is determined by the empirical patterns rather than 
evoking arbitrary thresholds (Kenny and Musatova, 2010; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 
2013).  
In any regression, a significant and large coefficient is interpreted as indicating that 
the given corruption input is typically used for reaching the corruption output even 
after taking into account alternative explanations, such as contract size or length, 
and all other corruption inputs. This still means that it can be used for other, non-
corrupt purposes in atypical cases; conversely, all the non-significant and weak 
explanatory factors may still be used for corrupt purposes, albeit only exceptionally. 
Component weights of the composite indicator are derived from regression 
coefficients; whereby, the larger coefficient means a higher component weight. This 
reflects the view that the more often a corruption input is used in combination with 
corruption outcomes the more confident we can be that institutionalised grand 
corruption lies behind its use. 
6.1 Modelling corrupt rent extraction: component weights 
Regression models were built based on the above theoretical expectations by 
entering each corruption input and controls step-by-step, entering first those inputs 
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which characterise the earliest tender phase such as publication of call for tenders 
and entering finally those which come into play the last such as contract completion. 
All those inputs were dropped from the models which were insignificant and/or too 
small to matter. Here, only final regression results are reported for the sake of 
brevity. The regressions are fitted only on markets with at least 3 different winners in 
2009-2012 to reduce the false positives from our measure of corrupt outcomes 
(single bidder contract). As the validity of all three outcome variables crucially hinges 
on the availability of suitable competitors, robustness checks are presented in Annex 
E excluding markets with fewer different winners throughout 2009-2012. The 
conclusions are substantially the same on the restricted samples too.6 We also 
restricted the analysis to experienced bidders (defined as Awarding at least 3 
contracts over 12 months), to reduce the possibility that the red-flags were due to 
inexperience.  
Thresholds in each continuous variable were identified in an iterative process: first, a 
model was fitted using the linear continuous predictor; second, discrete jumps in 
residual values were identified using residual distribution graphs. For example, 
average residual values of the regression using all the control variables plus the 
linear continuous measure of the relative price of documentation for predicting single 
received bid are depicted in Figure 1, left panel. It clearly indicates that there are 
three distinctive groups of relative document prices. For the lowest region, ranging 
between approximately the 24th and 40th percentiles, the model overestimates the 
probability of a single received bid, while it is the opposite case for the region 
between the 70th and 100th percentiles. These suggest at least three distinct 
                                               
6
 Further robustness checks were done excluding issuers which awarded few contracts. Regression 
results confirm the robustness of models on samples with issuers awarding at least 5, 10, and 50 
contracts. Regression outputs can be obtained from the authors. 
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categories.  The right panel of Figure 1 shows the same residual distribution after the 
categorical measure of relative document price replaced its continuous version in the 
model with categories following the cut-points identified earlier. No clear pattern 
remains in the residual distribution, suggesting most non-linearity has been 
accounted for by the categorical measure of relative document price. A similar 
procedure was followed in the case of every continuous variable; if necessary 
completing multiple iterations of searching for thresholds. 
In order to preserve the full population of observations, we always included a missing 
category in every categorical variable. In addition, this also helped measuring 
corruption inputs as concealing relevant tender information from bidders or the wider 
public often serves as a corruption technique. 
Figure 1. Mean regression residuals by two-percentiles of relative price of documentation, left 
panel: linear prediction; right panel: prediction after taking into account non-linearity 
 
Source: PP 
When deciding on whether a variable is significant in the model, we used 
significance values from Monte Carlo random permutation simulations (Good, 2006), 
even though standard Fisher significance tests would have led to the same 
conclusions in most cases. This is because standard Fisherian significance tests are 
appropriate for statistical inference from a random sample to a population. However, 
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our public procurement database contains the full population of interest. While some 
observations have been removed purposefully from the public domain hence from 
the database (a corruption risk on its own which is certainly far from random) this 
cannot be reflected by Fisher significance tests. Permutation tests are widely used in 
the natural as well as the social sciences, for example in social network analysis 
where data typically relates to full populations and observations are not independent 
of each other (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013). The Monte Carlo random 
permutation simulation randomly reassigns the outcome variable to observations 
multiple times and calculates the regression coefficients each time. By doing so, it 
obtains a distribution of each regression coefficient when the outcome is truly 
random. The probability of the actual test statistic falling outside this random 
distribution, therefore, represents the probability of observing the relationship when 
the outcome is truly random. A low significance level indicates that it is highly 
unlikely that the observed regression coefficient could be the result of a random 
process – a very intuitive interpretation. 
Three different regressions are reported in Table 4, two binary logistic regressions 
on single received bid and single valid bid, following the same structure:  
  (5) 
 iimmillikkijji CDASZ   43210  (6) 
where single bidderi equals 1 if the ith contract awarded had only one bidder and 0 if 
it has more; Zi represents the logit of a contract being a single bidder contract; β0 is 
the constant of the regression; Sij is the matrix of j corruption inputs of the 
submission phase for the ith contract such as length of submission period; Aik stands 
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for the matrix of k corruption inputs of the assessment phase for the ith contract such 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria; Dil stands for the matrix of l corruption inputs 
of the delivery phase for the ith contract such contract lengthening; Cim stands for the 
matrix of m control variables for the ith contract such as the number of competitors 
on the market; εi is the error term; and β1j, β2k , β3l, and β4m represent the vectors of 
coefficients for explanatory and control variables. 
In addition to the two logistic regression models in Table 4, a linear regression on 
winner’s share within issuer’s contracts is reported following the structure: 
 iimmillikkijji CDASY   43210  (7) 
where Yi represents winner’s share within issuer’s contracts; β0 is the constant of the 
regression; Sij is the matrix of j corruption inputs of the submission phase for the ith 
contract such as length of submission period; Aik stands for the matrix of k corruption 
inputs of the assessment phase for the ith contract such weight of non-price 
evaluation criteria; Dil stands for the matrix of l corruption inputs of the delivery phase 
for the ith contract such contract lengthening; Cim stands for the matrix of m control 
variables for the ith contract such as the number of competitors on the market; εi is 
the error term; and β1j, β2k , β3l, and β4m represent the vectors of coefficients for 
explanatory and control variables. 
The main differences among regressions are the outcome variables. Each 
regression includes the full list of controls and predictors having non-missing values 
in the given sample. Control variables account for the most important alternative 
explanations to our corrupt outcomes such as low administrative capacity and 
product market idiosyncrasies, in particular (for descriptive statistics of all control 
27 
 
variables see Annex F): 1) type of product procured using 40 different CPV7 divisions 
which control for differences in technology and market standards; 2) number of 
unique winners throughout 2009-2012 on the product market using a matrix of 820 
CPV categories at level 3 and 4 geographical regions using NUTS8 definitions which 
makes sure that our findings on single bidders and winner’s share within issuer’s 
contracts are not driven by the low number of competitors available on the market;9 
3) year of contracting which by and large proxies the changes in the legal framework 
and government in power; 4) log real contract value10 (2009 constant prices) 
controlling for the differences emanating from contract size and complexity; 5) 
contract length in years controlling for the differences emanating from contract size 
and complexity; 6) whether the contract is a framework contract which have specific 
regulations and procedural rules11; and 7) issuer type (e.g. central, regional), sector 
(e.g. education, health care), and status (private vs public) controlling for the 
regulatory as well as the institutional specificities of different issuers. 
To make the cleanest test of our index we only run the regressions in competitive 
markets with experienced issuers. We restrict the regressions to markets with at least 
3 unique winners throughout 2009-2012. These  markets are defined by a matrix of 820 CPV 
categories at level 3 and 4 geographical regions using NUTS definitions. Level 3 CPV 
categories identify markets such as medical equipment or beverage and spice crops; NUTS 
                                               
7
 CPV=Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more info see: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-and-
nomenclatures/codes-cpv/codes-cpv_en.htm 
8
 NUTS=Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. For more info see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
9
 A potential criticism against excluding such markets is that they may be the most corrupt markets 
biasing results. However, taking the full period of 2009-2012 means that there was a change of 
national government and many changes in local and regional administrations. Hence, the probability 
that the same market remained captured by the same 1 or 2 firms is very low implying that the 
observed low number of unique winners reflects market specificity rather than corruption. In addition, 
models run on the full sample revealed qualitatively identical cut-points and coefficents. 
10
 Log contract values are used instead of actual contract values because the contract value 
distribution is highly skewed with a few large contracts distorting results. 
11
 For details see:? http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/explan-notes/classic-
dir-framework_en.pdf  
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regions denote West, Central, and Eastern Hungary plus the country as a whole for national 
markets. So the matrix of these two dimensions creates markets such as medical equipment 
in Western Hungary or beverage and spice crops in Eastern Hungary. To ensure the 
tenderers are experienced we restrict the analysis to issuers awarding at least 3 contracts in 
the 12 months period prior to the contract award in question. 
Regression Results 
By and large, our hypotheses are supported by regressions, warranting the 
construction of a composite indicator reflecting systematically corrupt public 
procurement (Table 4). The explanatory power of models is moderate, R2 ranging 
between 0.1 and 0.2, which partially reflects the diversity of corruption techniques in 
this turbulent period of Hungary, while also indicating the need for including further 
corruption techniques, especially those which require further public data disclosure 
(e.g. evaluation scores per bidder). 
First, the single received or valid bid is a powerful predictor of winner’s share within 
issuer’s contracts. Those contracts with a single bid tend to be awarded to winners 
with 1.8 percent higher share within issuer’s previous contracts on average 
compared to contracts with more than one bids. This significant effect confirms that 
restricting the number of bids to one can support corrupt rent extraction on a 
recurrent basis. The magnitude of the impact is modest which is not surprising as 
restricting competition at the submission phase is only one of many ways to 
circumvent competition in public procurement. 
Second, not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal increases the 
probability of single received and valid bids and the winner’s contract share in every 
regression in line with expectations. For example, in model 1 and 2, it increases the 
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average probability of a single received bid contract award by 12.1-14.0 per cent, 
which is one of the strongest impact across models. 
Third, every non-open procedure type carries a higher corruption risk than open 
procedures in terms of single received and valid bids and winner’s contract share, 
supporting and further refining our theoretical expectations. Other, exceptional 
procedures carry the highest corruption risks adding 2.9 percent to winner’s share 
within issuer’s contracts compared to open procedures. Invitation and negotiation 
procedures are powerful and significant predictors in the regressions explaining 
single bidder contracts, but they have weak or counterintuitive impacts in the 
winner’s contract share regressions that suggests that their main effect is likely to 
come through number of bidders. Invitation procedures appear to have about twice 
as strong effect on the probability of a single bidder contract award (6.0-7.1 percent) 
as negotiation procedures (3.0-5.8 percent). 
Fourth, relative length of eligibility criteria behaves as expected with lengthier, thus 
more complex, criteria associated with higher probability of a single bidder contract 
and higher winner contract share. The effect of criteria length around the market 
average length seems weak, but positive indicating that there may be markets where 
complex criteria is frequently used to deter bidders. Criteria lengths considerably 
higher than market average are especially strongly associated with higher probability 
of single bidder contracts and higher winner contract share. For example, criteria 
length above market average by 520-2639 characters12 increases probability of a 
single received bid by 6.3-10.4 percent and the winner’s share within issuer’s 
contracts by 1.3 percent compared to the shortest criteria-length group. Interestingly, 
                                               
12
 Standard deviation of character lengths from the population mean is 3435 for the whole 2009-2012 
period. So, eligibility criteria 2639 characters above its market average is about three quarters 
standard deviation difference. 
30 
 
the call for tenders which are published, but don’t contain eligibility criteria at the 
section where it is prescribed by law, are associated with especially high corruption 
risks: 1.8-9.0 percent higher probability of single received bid contract compared to 
the shortest character length group. This signals that making eligibility criteria less 
visible deters bidders. 
Fifth, the shorter the submission period the higher the probability of single received 
and valid bids and winner contract share in line with expectations. This relationship 
appears in distinct jumps around legally prescribed thresholds and the abuse of 
weekends13. The exceptionally short submission period abusing weekends is one of 
the most powerful predictors in all of the models. It increases the winner’s share 
within issuer’s contracts by 7.6 percent and the probability of single valid bid by 19.8-
21.6 percent. Similar to criteria length, not displaying visibly and clearly the 
submission deadline is associated with very high corruption risks, for example 16 
percent higher probability of single received bid. As the effect is negligible on winner 
contract share, this corruption technique’s impact arises primarily in the submission 
phase. 
Sixth, more expensive tender documents increase both the probability of single 
bidder contracts and winner contract share in line with expectations. Compared to 
free documentation, document prices between 0.04-0.1 percent of the contract value 
increase the probability of single received bid by 2.9 percent and increase winner’s 
share within issuer’s contracts by 3.5 percent. Even more expensive tender 
documents have a stronger impact in the single bidder regressions, but insignificant 
and small effect in the winner contract share regression. This indicates that their 
                                               
13
 Abuse of weekends is possible as legally required time periods are defined in calendar days so the 
effective time companies would have for bid preparation can further be decreased by including 
weekends and national holidays in the submission period. 
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main effect is exercised in the submission phase. The effect of the cheapest tender 
documentation is ambiguous across regressions. Missing tender documentation 
price is insignificant in most regressions. Therefore, these categories receive a zero 
weight in the composite indicator. 
Seventh, call for tenders modifications behave according to expectations only for the 
period of the previous government (before 01/05/2010)14, that is it increases the 
probability of single bidder contracts and the winner’s market share. While it takes on 
a considerable significant negative coefficient under the current government’ period. 
These differences signal the changing role call for tenders modifications may play in 
corrupt rent extraction in response to changing regulatory (e.g. new Public 
Procurement Law entering into force soon after the new government entered into 
force) and political climate such judicial review of modifications (interviews indicate 
that the regulations and practice of judicial review of procurement tenders changed 
considerably after the new government entered office). Call for tenders modifications 
receive a positive weight in the composite indicator only for the pre-May 2012 period 
reflecting a conservative approach. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Restricted sample results are not reported here. Regression outputs can be obtained from the 
authors. 
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Table 4. Regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, average marginal effects reported for 
models 1-2 and unstandardized coefficients for model 3, nr. of winners >=3 
models 1 2 3 
Independent vars / dependent vars 
single 
received bid 
single valid bid 
winner's 12 month 
market share 
single received/valid bid 
  
0.018*** 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.14*** 0.121*** 0.039*** 
procedure type 
   
ref. cat.=open procedure 
   
1=invitation procedure 0.071*** 0.06*** -0.032* 
2=negotiation procedure 0.03*** 0.058*** 0.009* 
3=other procedures 0.274*** 0.258*** 0.029*** 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.028*** 0.017 -0.008 
relative length of eligibility criteria 
   
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 
   
1= -2922.125<length<=520.704 0.046*** 0.019 0.001 
2= 520.704<length<=2639.729 0.104*** 0.063*** 0.013 
3= 2639.729<length 0.124*** 0.071*** 0.014 
4= missing length 0.09*** 0.018*** 0.048*** 
short submission period15 
   
ref.cat.=normal submission period 
   
1=accelerated submission period 0.022*** 0.007 0.014*** 
2=exceptional submission period 0.09*** 0.084*** 0.047*** 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.216*** 0.198*** 0.076*** 
4=missing submission period 0.16*** 0.028 -0.009 
price of tender documentation relative to contract value 
   
ref.cat.= relative price=0% 
   
1= 0% <relative price<=0.04% -0.01 -0.042*** 0.062*** 
2= 0.040% <relative price<=0.01% 0.029** -0.005 0.035*** 
3= 0.01% <relative price<=0.211% 0.031*** 0.008 0.009 
4= 0.211% <relative price 0.049*** 0.012 0.000 
5=missing relative price -0.001 -0.017 -0.008* 
call for tenders modified -0.036*** -0.043*** 0.017*** 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
   
ref.cat.= only price 
   
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.002 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.069*** 0.05*** 0.028*** 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.038*** 
5=only non-price criteria 0.001 -0.012 0.007*** 
procedure annulled and re-launched -0.112*** -0.031* 
 
length of decision period in days 
   
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 
   
1= decision period<=32 0.078*** 0.117*** 0.013** 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.016*** 
4= 182<decision period 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.046*** 
5= missing decision period -0.02 -0.016 0.022* 
contract modified during delivery -0.004 -0.024*** 0.015*** 
contract extension(length/value) 
   
ref.cat.=c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 
   
2=0<c.length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 -0.061*** -0.026 -0.01 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. -0.017  0.000 -0.006 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) -0.022** -0.017* -0.002 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) -0.011* 0.005 0.003 
constant included in each regression; control variables: product market (cpv divisions); number of winners on the 
market (market defined by cpv level 4 and nuts 1) year of contract award; log real contract value; contract length; 
framework contract; issuer type, sector, and status (public or private) 
N 52390 42607 20653 
pseudo-R2 (logistic reg) or R2 (linear reg.) 0.104 0.099 0.243 
Source: PP; Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; P(permute) significance levels are obtained by Monte Carlo random 
permutation simulations (200 permutations) using stata 12.0 
                                               
15
 Exact number of days used for these categories differ per procedure type and year reflecting legally 
permissible deadlines. As an example, for open procedures before 2011, normal period is longer than 
21 days, accelerated period is between 21 and 14 days, exception period is between 14 and 5 days 
(excluding the weekend), and exceptional period abusing the weekend is less than 5 days including 
the weekend. 
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Eight, the effect of the weight of non-price evaluation criteria turned out to be 
somewhat different from expectations. Instead of a clearly positive relationship, we 
found an inverted U-shape relationship. This can be interpreted using our interview 
evidence: stipulating only or predominantly price-related evaluation criteria warrants 
fair competition, hence, it is associated with lower corruption risks. While majority 
subjective criteria suggests rigged competition deterring bidders and increasing 
winner contract share. Only non-price evaluation criteria combined with fixed price is 
most likely complying with certain industry standards such as IT procurement without 
signalling heightened corruption risks (Authors, 2013a). Hence, only the two 
categories with positive coefficient receive non-zero weights in the composite 
indicator. 
Ninth, annulling and re-launching procedures has the expected sign for both single 
received and single valid bid outcomes, but its effect cannot be determined on 
winner contract share as annulled tenders would bias contract share figures. 
Annulling a contract award is associated with 3.1-11.2 percent lower probability of 
single bidder contract award, that is contract awards are annulled and re-launched 
more often when there were multiple bidders. This is completely contradictory to the 
prescriptions of the EU Public Procurement Directive or the Hungarian Public 
Procurement Law, but in line with a corrupt rent extraction logic. 
Tenth, the effects of decision period length on probability of single bid and winner 
contract share are both somewhat different from our expectations. It seems that the 
relationship follows a U-shaped pattern with average decision period lengths 
(between 40th and 90th percentile) having the lowest corruption risk. Compared to 
this reference category, exceptionally long decision periods and exceptionally short 
decision periods are both associated with high corruption risks. Decision periods 
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longer than 182 working days result in 14.7-16.1 percent higher probability of single 
bid contract and 4.6 percent higher winner’s share within issuer’s contracts. Decision 
periods shorter than 32 working days are associated with 7.8-11.7 percent higher 
probability of single bid contract and 1.3 percent higher winner contract share. 
Decision periods between 32 and 44 working days have a somewhat weaker effect 
than exceptionally short decision periods. These results suggest that there are two 
mechanisms at play. First, exceptionally short decision periods may indicate rushed 
through decisions and the corresponding high corruption risks. Second, exceptionally 
long decision periods may signal multiple legal challenges and troubled decision 
making hence high corruption risks. While the missing category is significant in some 
models, its effect is far from clear, thus, it cannot be included in the composite 
indicator. 
Eleventh, contract modification has the expected relationships with probability of 
single bid and winner contract share albeit effect sizes are small in general and 
insignificant for model 1-2. Modifying contract at least once after contract award is 
associated with 2.4 percent lower probability of single valid bid and 1.5 percent 
higher winner’s share within issuer’s contracts. This indicates that a competitive 
contract award procedure may necessitate contract modification to assure rent 
extraction. 
Twelfth, increasing contract length and increasing the contract value after contract 
award had to be considered together due to low number of relevant observations. 
These two techniques can be combined in as much as they represent two parallel 
methods for increasing the profitability of a contract, that is making delivery cheaper 
by extending the completion deadline or making price higher by increasing contract 
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value. Contract extension (length/value) displays the expected relationships, but 
effects are insignificant for the winner contract share regression.  
Compared to contracts which were performed within the timeframe of delivery and 
original contract price (less than 0.1 percent value increase), contracts with 0-16.2 
percent longer delivery period or 0.1-24 percent higher contract value were 
associated with 2.6-6.1 percent lower probability of single received bid. For contracts 
which were extended even more the effects are insignificant which may signal that 
excessive project overruns are more often due to non-corrupt reasons such as low 
state capacity. For contracts whose contract completion announcement didn’t 
contain the prescribed final contract length or final contract value information, the 
probability of single bid was 1.1 percent lower which is a moderately strong impact. 
This suggests that competitive tendering makes it more necessary to hide the final 
total time of performance which potentially deviated from the original contractual 
terms. Hence, contract extensions of moderate magnitude and missing information 
are included in the composite indicator. 
Based on these regression results and prior theory, the variables and their 
categories could be selected which will make up the composite Corruption Risk 
Index (CRI) (for descriptive statistics of each component see Annex D). Component 
weights have to reflect theory, quantitative as well as qualitative results, and the 
authors’ assessment of the precision of these. First, all three corruption outcomes 
are part of CRI because their strong theoretical backing and close conceptual 
association with the definition of institutionalised grand corruption. We assign 
outcome variables a weight of 1 reflecting their benchmark status. Second, 
qualitative evidence clearly underlines that any of the corruption inputs (i.e. 
corruption techniques) is sufficient on its own to render a procurement procedure 
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corrupt. Therefore, each significant and substantial corruption input receives the 
weight of 1. In order to reflect coefficient sizes of categories in each corruption input 
as well as acknowledging the imprecision of point estimates, we ranked categories of 
each variable with the most impactful category receiving weight 1 and the others 
proportionately lower weights. For example, if there are four significant categories of 
a variable, then they would get weights 1, 0.75, 0.5, and 0.25. Finally, we normed 
each component weight so that the resulting composite indicator falls between 0 and 
1 (Table 5). This was achieved in two steps: component weights were divided by the 
total number of components (N=13), then the resulting score was divided by its 
observed maximum (CRI[raw]=0.805). This rescaling assures that the minimum 
(maximum) of the score corresponds to the lowest (highest) corruption risks 
observed. The upper end of the scale may be too conservative as the combined 
presence of 3-4 corruption inputs and/or outputs (CRI=0.27-0.36) is already almost 
certainly very corrupt according to our interviewees16.  
Once components are identified using the above regressions, alternative techniques 
could also be considered for deriving composite score(s), for example using 
predicted outcomes (risk prediction) (for a highly problematic, but similar approach 
see Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2013), developing corruption risk profiles using 
clustering techniques, or employing item response theory to extrapolate from 
observed characteristics to latent corruption risks. These avenues remain for further 
research as our aim was to develop a CRI score that is intuitive and straightforward. 
Using a simple weighted sum of inputs and outputs of the corrupt rent extraction 
process to derive CRI is methodologically preferred to the above alternatives for at 
                                               
16
 Calculating CRI for court decisions which established corruption in public procurement could serve 
as a more robust upper bound for the CRI scale. 
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least two reasons. First, additivity reflects our increasing certainty in corruption to 
take place rather than any need for combining corruption techniques for reaching 
corrupt goals (recall, even a single corruption input is enough on its own to render a 
tender fully corrupt), while any technique can be substituted for by another one. In 
particular the simultaneous presence of inputs and outputs represent reliable 
measurement of corruption risk. Second, the specified models and indicators only 
imperfectly capture corruption, there are omitted corruption techniques while the 
included techniques are only measured with considerable error. Hence, including 
inputs as well as outputs of the corruption process increases the measurement 
reliability of the composite score as different omissions and measurement errors are 
present on the two sides of the equation. Think for example about capturing single 
bidding as an outcome without any associated corruption technique due to omitted 
measure for the latter. In this case, including single bidding in CRI is superior to 
reporting no corruption risk at all. 
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Table 5. Component weights of CRI reflecting variable and category impact on corruption 
outcomes, normed to have an overall sum of 1 
Variable component weight 
single received/valid bid 0.096 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.096 
procedure type 
 
ref. cat.=open procedure 0.000 
1=invitation procedure 0.048 
2=negotiation procedure 0.072 
3=other procedures 0.096 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.024 
relative length of eligibility criteria 
 
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 0.000 
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.024 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.048 
3= 2639.729<length 0.072 
4= missing length 0.096 
short submission period 
 
ref.cat.=normal submission period 0.000 
1=accelerated submission period 0.048 
2=exceptional submission period 0.072 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.096 
4=missing submission period 0.024 
relative price of tender documentation 
 
ref.cat.= relative price=0 0.000 
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 0.000 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.096 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.064 
4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.032 
5=missing relative price 0.000 
call for tenders modification(only before 01/05/2010) 0.096 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
 
ref.cat.= only price 0.000 
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 0.000 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.048 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.096 
5=only non-price criteria 0.000 
procedure annulled and re-launched subsequently 0.096 
length of decision period 
 
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 0.000 
1= decision period<=32 0.064 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.032 
4= 182<decision period 0.096 
5= missing decision period 0.000 
contract modified during delivery 0.096 
contract extension(length/value) 
 
ref.cat.= c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 0.000 
2= 0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 0.096 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. 0.000 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) 0.048 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) 0.000 
winner's market share 0.096 
Source: PP 
Note: If the call for tenders or contract fulfilment announcements are missing, the index is reweighted to only 
reflect the available variables (i.e. proportionately increasing the weight of observed variables). 
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6.2 Validating the corruption risk index 
Validating CRI will take several years of work in multiple countries using many 
different indicators. Here only a few simple validation procedures can be reported. 
First, we look at the cross-sectional distribution of CRI to see if it follows any 
standard distribution underpinning its use in quantitative analyses such a linear 
regression. Second, the co-variation between CRI and a range of external hard 
measures of corruption risks is explored. 
First, applying the weights specified in Table 5, each contract receives a corruption 
risk index (CRI) falling into a 0–1 band. CRI of each awarded contract follows an 
approximately normal distribution, albeit it has a long tail to the right. These contracts 
with CRI higher than approximately 0.45-0.50 represent particularly high corruption 
risks and hence deserve attention in later research. The distribution also implies that 
CRI can be treated as a continuous variable in later regression analyses (same 
applies to organisation-level analysis). 
Second, we utilize four different external indicators for validating CRI, each of which 
is expected to co-vary with CRI in a particular way if CRI is a valid and reliable 
measure of corruption. All the tests are confirmatory.  
Profitability  
First, highly profitable companies are expected to display higher CRI because the 
primary aim of institutionalised grand corruption is to generate extra profit 
considerably above market average. However, we believe this relationship is likely to 
be only of moderate magnitude and probabilistic as high corruption companies are 
often hiding their profits and turnover through offshore companies, chains of 
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subcontractors, and tax fraud. These have been confirmed by interviews in Hungary 
and international research (Cole and Tran, 2011a, 2011b). 
Simple comparisons of companies falling in the terciles of annual profit margin reveal 
a relationship in line with expectations (Figure 2). Percentile comparisons are 
preferable to simple correlations as corruption and profitability may have a non-linear 
relationship (linear correlation coefficient is only 0.05). Companies of highest profit 
margin (higher than 5.15%) display higher CRI than any other company group, but 
the difference is especially large when compared to the group of lowest profit margin 
companies (annual profit margin<1.44%): 0.024 points higher CRI score or 10% 
percent more risky (0.024/0.24).  
Figure 2. Mean CRI by profit margin terciles, 2009-2012, N=3357 
 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 designate the significance of the difference from the “low CRI” 
group. Significance levels computed using Monte-Carlo random permutations (300 repetitions) with 
stata 12.0 
Ratio of price of final contract to price advertised in tender 
Second, further supporting the link between rent extraction and CRI, the ratio of the 
actual contract price to contract value to the advertised price in the tender is 
explored. As detailed information on unit prices is missing, the only way to determine 
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how expensive public procurement was is to compare the originally estimated 
contract value with the final contract value. Higher values of the ratio of contract 
value to estimated contract value indicate more expensive tenders (Ishii, 2009; 
Morozov & Podkolzina, 2013; Padhi & Mohapatra, 2011). By implication, this price 
ratio is expected to be positively associated with corruption risks.  
We find the expected relationship. The price ratio is positively correlated with CRI 
(corr=0.14) which indicates that prices are higher in high corruption risk tenders. This 
relationship is also pronounced when looking at the terciles of the price ratio which 
avoids the pitfalls for assuming a linear relationship (Figure 3). Contracts with price 
ratios above 1 display somewhat lower average CRI than contracts with price ratios 
between 0.9 and 1 which underlines the nonlinear relationship between prices and 
corruption risks. 
Figure 3. Mean CRI by price ratio terciles, 2009-2012, N=28 390 
 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; Significance levels computed using Monte-Carlo random permutations 
(300 repetitions) with stata 12.0 
Political ties 
Third, we expect that companies with political connections to display higher 
corruption risks as the primary vehicle for maintaining institutionalised grand 
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corruption is to have strong ties between powerful political and business actors 
(Coviello and Gagliarducci, 2010; Grodeland, 2005). We mapped the owners and 
manager of each company winning in 2009-2012 (15 percent of companies were 
either unidentifiable or we lacked the relevant data) and matched them with key 
political officeholders of public organisations existing in the period (for full list of 
institutions and offices see Table 6). The matching was done between more than 
35000 owners/managers of winning firms and more than 10000 political officeholders 
based on full name. Matching solely on name is obviously prone to random error that 
is nevertheless set aside for the present analysis by assuming that name frequency 
is not correlated with CRI. Those companies that have or had at least one owner or 
manager holding a political office at any point in time were designated as politically 
connected firms. 
Table 6. List of institutions and positions of the political office holder database, 2010-2011 
Institution Position 
Ministries 
minister, secretary of state, vice-secretary of state, 
ministerial councillor,  
Constitutional court members and leaders 
County courts president, vice- president 
Supreme court President, vice-president, spokesperson 
Prosecutors' Office Chief prosecutor, vice-chief prosecutor, spokesperson 
Municipalities Major, vice-major, notary 
County governments (new 
“kormányhivatal” too) president, vice-president, notary 
Regional police Chief 
National police headquarters Chief, vice-chief, spokesperson 
Minority governments president, vice-president, head of office head of secretary 
National medical service Chief doctor, chief pharmacist 
National Healthcare Fund Director, vice-director 
Army headquarters Marshal, Vice-marshal 
Treasury President, vice-president, head of finances 
Tax Administration President, vice-president, spokesperson 
Office of the president President of the state, heads of every bureau of the office 
State Audit Office President, vice-president, chief director, director of finances 
Regional Development Councils presidents, member of governing committee 
Office of the parliament Head of office, heads of offices 
Ombudsmen offices Ombudsmen, heads of offices 
National headquarters of Prisons National chief, national vice-chief,  
Competition Authority President, vice-president, head of secretary 
Central statistical office president, vice-president 
Other regulatory agencies and 
background institutes 
top-management (2-3 positions) 
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Note: The full list of institutions and positions can be obtained from the data provider, the government 
owned MTI Hungarian News Agency, which maintains a database of the most significant political 
office holders of the country for more than 20 years. For more information see: http://mkk.mti.hu/  
In line with our expectations, politically connected firms have a higher CRI by 0.01 on 
average than companies without political connections. While this difference is 
relatively small,17 increasing the precision of identifying political connections could 
shed more light on the validity of CRI. The magnitude of group differences may also 
signal that direct political connections serve as a means to corruption only in some 
cases while in others political ties operate through seemingly unrelated brokers and 
a range of intermediaries. 
Registration in tax havens 
Finally, we expect that high corruption companies are strongly associated with 
money laundering and secretive company registration arrangements (Gounev and 
Bezlov, 2010). These are most straightforwardly measured by the Financial Secrecy 
Index (FSI) of the countries where winning companies or their owners are registered. 
The FSI measures to what degree a country’s company registry, tax, and financial 
regulatory framework facilitates secrecy and provides for tax heavens exclusively 
based on objective data on regulations and their implementation (Tax Justice 
Network, 2013). In line with prior expectations, companies registered in tax heavens 
(FSI>58.5) are of considerably and significantly higher corruption risks as measured 
by CRI compared to companies registered in relatively transparent countries (Figure 
4). The difference is quite substantial (∆CRI=0.02) even though relatively few 
companies are registered outside Hungary (only slightly more than 2 percent winning 
firms). 
                                               
17
 This difference remains unchanged when taking into account the number of managers with different 
names in the database suggesting that the relationship is not an artefact of matching politicians and 
businessman based on name only. 
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Figure 4. Average CRI scores of companies of foreign origin according to the Financial 
Secrecy Index of the domicile country, 2009-2012, N=414 
0.24
0.26
0.25
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.27
Financial Secrecy
Index<58.5
Financial Secrecy
Index>58.5***
Missing(Financial
Secrecy Index)***
mean CRI
 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.005; *** p<0.001, Significance levels computed using Monte-Carlo random 
permutations (300 repetitions) with stata 12.0 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis demonstrated that it is feasible and fruitful to measure corruption at the 
micro-level based exclusively on ‘objective’ behavioural data. Initial evidence 
confirms the validity of CRI. The great advantage of our approach is that a large 
amount of data is available for research across every developed country starting 
from about 2008, opening up a completely new horizon for comparative corruption 
research. Such comparative research will also benefit from a measure of corruption 
that avoids the pitfalls of subjective indicators as well as prior ‘objective’ indicators 
like institutional arrangements. Even if one is happy with existing measures of 
corruption, the CRI adds an entirely new measure that can be used to validate other 
analyses.  
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Following this article’s methodology institutionalised grand corruption can be 
measured on the level of individual contracts and tenders in about 50 countries 
around the globe since 2008-2009. This opens up a whole new universe of scientific 
and policy applications on many levels. The CRI is calculated at the individual 
contract level, and can be scaled up to the tendering organization, the sector, local 
jurisdiction, region or the country. This flexibility opens up a large number of 
hypotheses that can be tested, but we mention only a few. First, data on tendering 
organizations can be combined with organizational level data to test various theories 
of corruption. For example, are higher salaries for bureaucrats more conducive to 
clean government? Perhaps there is a non-linear relationship between bureaucratic 
size/pay and corruption? Are bigger bureaucracies more prone to corruption than 
smaller ones? Since the CRI is valid over time, scholars can also evaluate how 
various reforms in different sectors affect corruption. Does deregulation or 
privatization increase or decrease corruption? Since the CRI can be calculated at the 
local level, scholars can estimate the impact of political contestation on corruption. 
Since it can also be aggregated by funding source, scholars can investigate whether 
external funds (e.g. EU funds) are more prone to corruption than internally generated 
funds.  
Beyond the academy, the CRI can be used to evaluate single regulatory or 
organisational changes such as tightening reporting requirements or introducing 
integrity management, providing data to evaluate what works to reduce corruption. 
The CRI could also guide regulators in where to spend their limited resources for 
conducting audits of contracts and companies. In addition to these and many other 
academic and policy applications, with a little work the CRI can be made available to 
citizens, civil society groups and journalists to hold politicians and political parties 
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accountable for corrupt behaviour. It could also be used by businesses in deciding 
where to spend their resources in preparing bids for tenders.  
In sum, the CRI can revolutionize the study of corruption, and provide an invaluable 
resource for limiting corruption in the real world. We hope that it inspires other 
attempts to utilise the vast pool of data now available in digital format (“big data”) to 
generate objective indicators of various components of state activity and capacity. 
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX A - SUMMARY OF SELECTED STUDIES USING OBJECTIVE INDICATORS 
OF CORRUPTION 
Table A1. Summary of selected studies using objective indicators of corruption 
paper indicator used Country year sector potential for international comparison part of CRI* 
Auriol et al. 
(2011) 
Exceptional procedure type Paraguay 2004-2007 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
If procedure definitions can be aligned, international 
comparisons can be made widely 
Yes 
Bandiera, Prat, 
and Valletti 
(2009) 
Price differentials for standard goods 
purchased locally or through a 
national procurement agency 
Italy 2000-2005 
various 
standardized 
goods (e.g. 
paper) 
LOW 
Price data is not readily available in most countries, many 
countries don't have national procurement agencies, national 
procurement agencies are likely to be captured in many 
countries. 
No 
Coviello and 
Gagliarducci 
(2010) 
Number of bidders 
Same firm awarded contracts 
recurrently 
Level of competition 
Italy 2000-2005 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
Number of bidders, recurrent contract award, and 
competitiveness of bids are available in many countries. 
Yes 
Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky 
(2003) 
Difference in prices of standardized 
products such as ethyl alcohol 
Brazil 1996-1997 health care 
MEDIUM 
Detailed product-level price and quantity information is not 
readily available across many countries, but can be 
collected. 
No 
Ferraz and 
Finan (2008) 
Corruption uncovered by federal 
audits of local government finances 
Brazil 2003 
federal-local 
transfers 
LOW 
high quality audits, not influenced by powerful corrupt groups 
are unlikely to be available in many countries. 
No 
Golden and 
Picci (2005) 
Ratio of physical stock of 
infrastructure to cumulative spending 
on infrastructure 
Italy 1997 infrastructure 
MEDIUM 
It is hard to compute comparable value of the stock of 
physical capital across countries different in the quality of 
infrastructure and geography. 
No 
Goldman et al. 
(2013) 
Political office holders' position on 
company boards 
USA 1990-2004 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
Company contract volumes can be estimated in many 
countries and publicly listed companies political connections 
can be traced relatively easily. 
No 
Hyytinen et al. 
(2008) 
Number and type of invited firms 
Use of restricted procedure 
Sweden 1990-1998 
cleaning 
services 
HIGH 
Both number of bidders and procedure types are readily 
Yes 
51 
 
available in many countries. 
Olken (2006) 
Difference between the quantity of in-
kind benefits (rice) received according 
to official records and reported survey 
evidence 
Indonesia 1998-1999 
welfare 
spending 
MEDIUM 
It is possible to design user surveys across a wide range of 
countries to track actual receipts, although it may be 
expensive. 
No 
Olken (2007) 
Differences between the officially 
reported and independently audited 
prices and quantities of road 
construction projects  
Indonesia 2003-2004 
infrastructure 
(roads) 
LOW 
Auditing large numbers of projects by independent engineers 
is costly and unlikely to allow for cross-country comparisons. 
No 
Klasnja (2015) 
Single bidder procedures 
Non-open procedure types 
Romania 2008-2012 
general 
procurement 
HIGH 
If procedure definitions and bidding conditions can be 
aligned, international comparisons can be made widely 
Yes 
Reinikka and 
Svensson 
(2004) 
Difference between block grants 
received by schools according to 
official records and user survey 
Uganda 1991-1995 education 
MEDIUM 
It is possible to design user surveys across a wide range of 
countries to track actual receipts, although it may be 
expensive. 
No 
*CRI=Corruption Risk Index, developed in this paper 
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ANNEX B - AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DATA 
Table B1. Overview of contract-level public procurement data availability in selected countries and regions, 2000-2012 
Country Data-source Key online source 
Minimum threshold 
(2012, classical issuer, 
services, EUR)
18
 
Period Availability 
Czech 
Republic 
Ministerstvo pro místní rozvoj ČR http://www.isvzus.cz/usisvz/  39,000 2006-2012 
structured data readily available 
and partially cleaned 
EU Tenders Electronic Daily http://ted.europa.eu/ 130,000 2005-2012 
structured data partially 
available and cleaned 
Germany Bund.de- Verwaltung Online 
http://www.bund.de/DE/Aussch
reibungen/ausschreibungen_n
ode.html 
130,000
19
 2010-2012
20
 raw data available, not cleaned 
Hungary Közbeszerzési Értesítő http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/ 27,300 2005-2012 
structured data available and 
partially cleaned 
Romania eLicitatie http://www.e-licitatie.ro/  30,000 2007-2012 raw data available, not cleaned 
Russia Goszakupki 
www.zakupki.gov.ru 
2,500 2006-2012
21
 
structured data partially 
available and cleaned 
Slovakia Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie http://tender.sme.sk/en/ 30,000 2005-2012 
structured data readily available 
and partially cleaned 
UK UK Contracts Finder 
http://www.contractsfinder.busi
nesslink.gov.uk/  
11,600 2000-2012 raw data available, not cleaned 
US 
Federal Procurement Data System - 
Next Generation 
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_c
ms/  
1,850 2004-2012 
structured data readily available 
and partially cleaned 
                                               
18
 National currencies are converted into EUR using official exchange rates of 5/2/2013 of the European Central Bank. 
19
 It was increased from 30,000 EUR during the economic crisis. 
20
 Earlier data have to be requested from the relevant bodies. 
21
 2006-2010 only for some regions. 
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ANNEX C – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF 
CORRUPTION INPUTS 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics of corruption inputs, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique 
winners 
 
mean min max sd N 
Single bidder contract 0.301 0.00 1.00 0.46 51012 
Exclusion of all but one bid 0.367 0.00 1.00 0.48 41277 
Call for tender not published in official journal 0.388 0.00 1.00 0.49 51823 
Length of submission period in days 27.080 2.00 751.00 12.62 29885 
Relative price of tender documentation 0.003 0.00 0.20 0.01 16743 
Call for tenders modification 0.109 0.00 1.00 0.31 31726 
Annulled procedure re-launched subsequently 0.061 0.00 1.00 0.24 55217 
Weight of non-price evaluation criteria 0.216 0.00 1.00 0.33 51823 
Length of decision period in days 126.960 0.00 1404.00 168.31 28605 
Contract modification 0.189 0.00 1.00 0.39 51823 
Contract lengthening 0.014 -0.97 30.29 0.26 16238 
Contract value increase 0.079 -0.80 5.00 0.53 6547 
Source: PP 
 
Table C2. Distribution of procedure type, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique winners 
 
N % 
open 31,007 59.83 
invitation 906 1.75 
negotiation 9,510 18.35 
other 5,760 11.11 
missing/error 4,640 8.95 
Total 51,823 100 
Source: PP 
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ANNEX D – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CRI 
COMPONENTS  
Table D1. Descriptive statistics of CRI components, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique 
winners 
CRI component name mean median sd N 
single bidder 0.353 0.000 0.478 45,652 
no call for tenders published 0.336 0.000 0.472 45,865 
procedure type 0.279 0.000 0.385 45,865 
length of eligibility criteria 0.311 0.250 0.348 45,865 
submission period 0.074 0.000 0.173 45,865 
document relative price 0.126 0.000 0.277 45,865 
call for tenders modification 0.026 0.000 0.158 45,865 
weight of non-price criteria 0.110 0.000 0.279 45,844 
Cancellation & relaunch 0.073 0.000 0.260 45,865 
decision period 0.185 0.000 0.313 45,865 
contract modification 0.197 0.000 0.397 45,865 
price incr./contr. lengthening 0.095 0.000 0.217 45,865 
winner contract share 0.127 0.071 0.169 43,749 
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Table D2. Pairwise linear correlation coefficients among CRI components, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique winners 
 
single 
bidder 
no call for 
tenders 
published 
procedure 
type 
length of 
eligibility 
criteria 
submission 
period 
document 
relative 
price 
call for 
tenders 
modification 
weight of 
non-price 
criteria 
Cancellation 
& relaunch 
decision 
period 
contract 
modification 
price 
incr./contr. 
lengthening 
winner 
contract 
share 
single bidder 1 
            
no call for tenders published 0.0117* 1 
           
procedure type 0.1176* 0.4217* 1 
          
length of eligibility criteria 0.0110* -0.6350* -0.2336* 1 
         
submission period 0.0259* -0.3048* -0.0055 0.0845* 1 
        
document relative price -0.0002 -0.3227* -0.1279* 0.1432* 0.0526* 1 
       
call for tenders modification -0.0026 -0.1152* -0.0103* -0.0228* 0.1306* 0.0316* 1 
      
weight of non-price criteria 0.0093* -0.1856* -0.1024* 0.5362* 0.0468* 0.0194* -0.0124* 1 
     
Cancellation & relaunch 0.0961* -0.1246* -0.0003 0.1082* 0.0809* 0.0619* 0.0757* 0.0153* 1 
    
decision period 0.0841* -0.4211* -0.2086* 0.2610* 0.0016 0.1671* -0.0421* 0.0686* 0.0587* 1 
   
contract modification -0.0007 -0.1722* -0.0198* 0.1477* 0.0635* 0.0695* 0.1205* 0.0503* 0.1558* 0.0683* 1 
  
price incr./contr. lengthening 0.0141* -0.1202* -0.006 0.0744* 0.0709* -0.0477* 0.0459* 0.0353* 0.1142* 0.1114* 0.1745* 1 
 
winner contract share 0.0386* 0.0022 0.0767* 0.0577* 0.0546* 0.1250* 0.0098* 0.0154* 0.0824* -0.0159* 0.1135* -0.0346* 1 
Note: *=significant at 5% level 
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ANNEX E - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The most convincing alternative explanation to this paper’s interpretation of 
regressions as models of corrupt contract award states that products and services 
bought by public agencies are highly specific. Therefore, both single bidder and high 
share of the winner within the issuer’s contracts are driven by the lack of adequate 
suppliers rather than corruption. In order to control for this important confounding 
factor each regression contains the number of winners on the market throughout 
2009-2012 as an explanatory factor. In addition, this annex reports regressions on 
restricted samples which include contracts for products and services procured on 
markets with more than 2, 9, and 37 winners in 2009-2012. The cut-points 2 and 37 
were defined using the same technique of identifying thresholds in continuous 
variables as spelled out in section 6.1. The cut-point of 9 was added arbitrarily in 
order to display an intermediary value. 
To define the number of adequate competitors on a market, an appropriate definition 
of market has to be found. We defined markets along two dimensions: 1) the nature 
of product or service procured, and 2) the geographical location of contract 
performance. CPV codes differentiate over 3000 products and services as detailed 
as eggs (03142500-3) or potatoes (03212100-1). While we aim at being conservative 
in market definition, such level of detail is surely excessive. Exploiting the 
hierarchical nature of CPV classification, level-4 categories were selected as suitable 
for market definition, because the distribution of winners throughout 2009-2012 
suggested that there are a large number of markets with a fairly small winners. 
Contracts were awarded in 820 level-4 CPV categories such as crops, products of 
market gardening and horticulture (0311) or construction materials (4411). Even 
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though Hungary is a relatively small country interviewees suggested that there may 
be geographical frontiers of markets. Hence, we used 3 NUTS-1 regions plus the 
whole country to define markets along a geographical dimension (national reach 
typically requires an extensive set of local offices warranting an effective market 
barrier). Taken together, these resulted in 820*4=3280 distinct markets. 
To define how many suitable competitors a market has, we simply calculated the 
number of unique winners of each market throughout 2009-2012. This is a 
conservative estimate as bidders who never won, for example because they were 
too expensive, but submitted valid bids were not taken into account. As some 
companies may have gone bankrupt or been bought by others, this estimation 
strategy may also be somewhat upward biased; therefore in some regressions we 
excluded markets with very many competitors. 
The below tables demonstrate the robustness of our models to excluding markets 
with specific products and services (Tables E1 and E2). Each of the findings in these 
alternative specifications remain unchanged compared to the main regressions, 
while indicators of goodness of fit improve somewhat. 
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Table E1. Regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, average marginal effects reported 
for models 1-2 and unstandardized coefficients for model 3, nr. of winners >=38 
models 1 2 3 
Independent vars / dependent vars 
single 
received bid 
single valid bid 
winner's 12 
month market 
share 
single received/valid bid 
  
0.027*** 
P(Fisher) 
  
0.000 
P(permute) 
  
0.000 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.057*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.002 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
procedure type 
   
ref. cat.=open procedure 
   
1=invitation procedure 0.06*** 0.058*** -0.021 
P(Fisher) 0.206 0.339 0.471 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.195 
2=negotiation procedure 0.03*** 0.063*** 0.013 
P(Fisher) 0.074 0.002 0.235 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.055 
3=other procedures 0.3*** 0.281*** 0.031*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.003 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.039*** 0.026*** -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.017 0.165 0.379 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.275 
relative length of eligibility criteria 
   
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 
   
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.033*** 0.009 0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.227 0.784 0.233 
P(permute) 0.000 0.420 0.175 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.106*** 0.07*** 0.022 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.052 0.114 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.070 
3= 2639.729<length 0.116*** 0.068*** 0.025 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.087 0.106 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.025 
4= missing length 0.057*** -0.008*** 0.041* 
P(Fisher) 0.132 0.841 0.052 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.015 
short submission period 
   
ref.cat.=normal submission period 
   
1=accelerated submission period 0.025*** 0.009 0.015*** 
P(Fisher) 0.028 0.530 0.045 
P(permute) 0.000 0.260 0.010 
2=exceptional submission period 0.089*** 0.065*** 0.012 
P(Fisher) 0.006 0.090 0.514 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.500 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.193*** 0.153*** 0.039 
P(Fisher) 0.004 0.013 0.423 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.520 
4=missing submission period 0.163*** 0.047* -0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.308 0.641 
P(permute) 0.000 0.015 0.495 
relative price of tender documentation 
   
ref.cat.= relative price=0 
   
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 -0.013 -0.047*** 0.056*** 
P(Fisher) 0.531 0.053 0.010 
P(permute) 0.295 0.000 0.000 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.016 -0.019 0.038*** 
P(Fisher) 0.455 0.418 0.015 
P(permute) 0.195 0.175 0.000 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.031*** -0.005 0.012 
P(Fisher) 0.135 0.839 0.388 
P(permute) 0.005 0.720 0.245 
4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.055*** 0.015 0.003 
P(Fisher) 0.009 0.482 0.803 
P(permute) 0.000 0.160 0.765 
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models 2 4 5 
5=missing relative price 0.005 -0.02 -0.012* 
P(Fisher) 0.828 0.416 0.304 
P(permute) 0.620 0.065 0.180 
call for tenders modified -0.02* -0.016 0.005 
P(Fisher) 0.288 0.538 0.610 
P(permute) 0.030 0.105 0.515 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
   
ref.cat.= only price 
   
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 0.005 -0.017*** -0.003 
P(Fisher) 0.718 0.316 0.722 
P(permute) 0.405 0.000 0.585 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.091*** 0.069*** 0.047*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.102*** 0.086*** 0.045*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5=only non-price criteria -0.002 -0.009 0.001 
P(Fisher) 0.900 0.615 0.893 
P(permute) 0.840 0.360 0.865 
procedure annulled and re-launched -0.098*** -0.027* 
 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.422 
 
P(permute) 0.000 0.035 
 
length of decision period 
   
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 
   
1= decision period<=32 0.067*** 0.119*** 0.014* 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.110 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.020 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.023*** 0.042*** 0.021*** 
P(Fisher) 0.067 0.003 0.019 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 182<decision period 0.147*** 0.187*** 0.05*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.005 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5= missing decision period -0.024* -0.022 0.032** 
P(Fisher) 0.249 0.418 0.112 
P(permute) 0.010 0.060 0.005 
contract modified during delivery -0.003 -0.029*** 0.023*** 
P(Fisher) 0.765 0.028 0.001 
P(permute) 0.545 0.000 0.000 
contract extension(length/value) 
   
ref.cat.=c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 
   
2=0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 -0.063*** -0.026 -0.011 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.269 0.445 
P(permute) 0.000 0.110 0.475 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. -0.015  0.011  -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.468 0.605 0.523 
P(permute) 0.335 0.520 0.575 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) -0.008 -0.007* -0.001 
P(Fisher) 0.634 0.707 0.883 
P(permute) 0.340 0.395 0.825 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) -0.013* 0.007 0.005 
P(Fisher) 0.252 0.594 0.582 
P(permute) 0.030 0.255 0.380 
constant included in each regression; control variables: product market (cpv divisions); number of 
winners on the market (market defined by cpv level 4 and nuts 1) year of contract award; log real 
contract value; contract length; framework contract; issuer type, sector, and status (public or private) 
N 36977 30365 13019 
R2/pseudo-R2 0.1101 0.1024 0.2558 
 Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; clustered standard errors clustered by issuer for P(Fisher), Monte Carlo random 
permutation simulations for P(permute) (200 permutations) using stata 12.0 
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Table E2. Regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, average marginal effects reported 
for models 1-2 and unstandardized coefficients for model 3, nr. of winners >=110 
models 1 2 3 
Independent vars / dependent vars 
single 
received 
bid 
single valid 
bid 
winner's 12 
month 
market 
share 
single received/valid bid 
  
0.034*** 
P(Fisher) 
  
0.000 
P(permute) 
  
0.000 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.136*** 0.114*** 0.032 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.010 0.150 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.085 
procedure type 
   
ref. cat.=open procedure 
   
1=invitation procedure 0.054*** 0.05** -0.054* 
P(Fisher) 0.304 0.451 0.196 
P(permute) 0.000 0.010 0.030 
2=negotiation procedure 0.023** 0.056*** 0.032*** 
P(Fisher) 0.208 0.009 0.051 
P(permute) 0.005 0.000 0.000 
3=other procedures 0.309*** 0.287*** 0.037*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.007 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.037*** 0.02 -0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.062 0.376 0.741 
P(permute) 0.000 0.080 0.660 
relative length of eligibility criteria 
   
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 
   
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.029* -0.004 0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.345 0.896 0.565 
P(permute) 0.015 0.785 0.605 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.093*** 0.056*** 0.02 
P(Fisher) 0.006 0.121 0.247 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.195 
3= 2639.729<length 0.107*** 0.052** 0.027* 
P(Fisher) 0.003 0.178 0.140 
P(permute) 0.000 0.005 0.035 
4= missing length 0.039*** -0.009*** 0.018 
P(Fisher) 0.325 0.829 0.527 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.380 
short submission period 
   
ref.cat.=normal submission period 
   
1=accelerated submission period 0.025*** 0.006 0.014 
P(Fisher) 0.062 0.715 0.177 
P(permute) 0.000 0.605 0.060 
2=exceptional submission period 0.086*** 0.062** 0.015 
P(Fisher) 0.006 0.120 0.660 
P(permute) 0.000 0.005 0.585 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.204*** 0.169** -0.027 
P(Fisher) 0.008 0.016 0.501 
P(permute) 0.000 0.005 0.765 
4=missing submission period 0.165*** 0.053* 0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.001 0.273 0.907 
P(permute) 0.000 0.010 0.885 
relative price of tender documentation 
   
ref.cat.= relative price=0 
   
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 -0.007 -0.063*** 0.036 
P(Fisher) 0.765 0.029 0.168 
P(permute) 0.615 0.000 0.070 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.014 -0.04* 0.022 
P(Fisher) 0.555 0.146 0.269 
P(permute) 0.255 0.015 0.140 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.032* -0.029 -0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.193 0.258 0.834 
P(permute) 0.020 0.070 0.735 
4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.069*** 0.009 -0.005 
P(Fisher) 0.005 0.707 0.768 
P(permute) 0.000 0.540 0.700 
5=missing relative price 0.01 -0.039*** -0.038*** 
P(Fisher) 0.687 0.146 0.033 
P(permute) 0.305 0.000 0.000 
call for tenders modified -0.028*** -0.02 0 
P(Fisher) 0.118 0.456 0.989 
P(permute) 0.000 0.095 0.990 
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models 2 4 5 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
   
ref.cat.= only price 
   
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 -0.005 -0.031*** -0.008 
P(Fisher) 0.729 0.087 0.456 
P(permute) 0.425 0.000 0.270 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.077*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.017 0.007 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.124*** 0.102*** 0.077*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5=only non-price criteria 0.014 0.005 -0.004 
P(Fisher) 0.355 0.795 0.751 
P(permute) 0.115 0.675 0.720 
procedure annulled and re-launched -0.076*** -0.025 
 
P(Fisher) 0.007 0.445 
 
P(permute) 0.000 0.100 
 
length of decision period 
   
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 
   
1= decision period<=32 0.033*** 0.089*** 0.005** 
P(Fisher) 0.015 0.000 0.688 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.610 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.019* 0.03** 0.01 
P(Fisher) 0.212 0.051 0.441 
P(permute) 0.035 0.005 0.305 
4= 182<decision period 0.143*** 0.159*** 0.055*** 
P(Fisher) 0.000 0.001 0.013 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5= missing decision period -0.035*** -0.038*** 0.016 
P(Fisher) 0.088 0.177 0.461 
P(permute) 0.000 0.000 0.440 
contract modified during delivery 0.001 -0.023** 0.022*** 
P(Fisher) 0.922 0.102 0.015 
P(permute) 0.835 0.005 0.000 
contract extension(length/value) 
   
ref.cat.=c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 
   
2=0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 -0.048** -0.01 -0.022 
P(Fisher) 0.012 0.719 0.252 
P(permute) 0.005 0.580 0.225 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. -0.035*  -0.005  -0.023 
P(Fisher) 0.119 0.858 0.192 
P(permute) 0.025 0.790 0.185 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) 0.002 0.015 0 
P(Fisher) 0.900 0.457 0.995 
P(permute) 0.830 0.195 0.985 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) -0.009 0.011 -0.01 
P(Fisher) 0.454 0.416 0.372 
P(permute) 0.195 0.190 0.220 
constant included in each regression; control variables: product market (cpv divisions); number of 
winners on the market (market defined by cpv level 4 and nuts 1) year of contract award; log real 
contract value; contract length; framework contract; issuer type, sector, and status (public or private) 
N 25813 21584 7806 
R2/pseudo-R2 0.1272 0.1148 0.2448 
Source: PP 
Note:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; clustered standard errors clustered by issuer for P(Fisher), Monte Carlo random 
permutation simulations for P(permute) (200 permutations) using stata 12.0 
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ANNEX F – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table F1. Descriptive statistics of control variables, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique 
winners 
Variable name mean min max sd N 
number of unique winners 144.827 3.00 674.00 170.57 47768 
log real contract value 16.034 9.04 25.08 1.85 49867 
contract length in years 1.178 0.00 35.00 1.68 34684 
PPPs/framework contracts 0.114 0.00 1.00 0.32 51823 
Source: PP 
 
 
Table F2. Distribution of issuer type, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique winners 
type of issuer N % 
central organisation 10,057 19.41 
public utility 2,252 4.35 
regional/local organisation 25,945 50.06 
supported body 2,114 4.08 
body established by public law 5,282 10.19 
other 4,498 8.68 
missing 1,675 3.23 
total 51,823 100 
Source: PP 
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Table F3. Distribution of issuer main sector, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique winners 
main sector of issuer N % 
general public services 17,922 34.58 
education 4,828 9.32 
health 1,506 2.91 
culture, sports 1,997 3.85 
environment, agriculture 1,379 2.66 
energy 1,211 2.34 
finance, post 1,111 2.14 
welfare 1,222 2.36 
transport 784 1.51 
defence, policing 955 1.84 
water, sewage, waste 437 0.84 
other 3,553 6.86 
missing 14,918 28.79 
total 51,823 100 
Source: PP 
 
 
Table F4. Distribution of issuer status, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique winners 
status of issuer N % 
private 15,050 29.04 
public 36,398 70.24 
missing 375 0.72 
total 51,823 100 
 Source: PP 
 
 
Table F5. Distribution of contract award year, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique 
winners 
year of contract award N % 
2009 10,587 20.43 
2010 17,487 33.74 
2011 13,708 26.45 
2012 10,041 19.38 
total 51,823 100 
 Source: PP 
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Table F6. Distribution of main market of contract, 2009-2012, markets with at least 3 unique 
winners 
main market of contract N % 
administration, defence and social security services 56 0.11 
agricultural machinery 355 0.69 
agricultural, farming, fishing, forestry and related products 118 0.23 
agricultural, forestry, horticultural, aquacultural and apicultural services 434 0.84 
architectural, construction, engineering and inspection services 4,275 8.32 
business services: law, marketing, consulting, recruitment, printing and security 4,739 9.22 
chemical products 226 0.44 
clothing, footwear, luggage articles and accessories 161 0.31 
construction structures and materials; auxiliary products to construction 510 0.99 
construction work 17,862 34.76 
education and training services 1,489 2.9 
electrical machinery, apparatus, equipment and consumables; lighting 223 0.43 
financial and insurance services 625 1.22 
food, beverages, tobacco and related products 4,123 8.02 
furniture, furnishings, domestic appliances and cleaning products 1,120 2.18 
health and social work services 516 1 
hotel, restaurant and retail trade services 717 1.4 
industrial machinery 539 1.05 
installation services (except software) 54 0.11 
it services: consulting, software development, internet and support 980 1.91 
laboratory, optical and precision equipment (excl. glasses) 815 1.59 
leather and textile fabrics, plastic and rubber materials 31 0.06 
machinery for mining, quarrying, construction equipment 74 0.14 
medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and personal care products 3,121 6.07 
mining, basic metals and related products 13 0.03 
musical instruments, sport goods, games, toys, handicraft, art mat. and accessories 357 0.69 
office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies ex. furniture and software 1,906 3.71 
other community, social and personal services 173 0.34 
petroleum products, fuel, electricity and other sources of energy 823 1.6 
postal and telecommunications services 114 0.22 
printed matter and related products 688 1.34 
public utilities 14 0.03 
radio, television, communication, telecommunication and related equipment 249 0.48 
real estate services 367 0.71 
recreational, cultural and sporting services 246 0.48 
repair and maintenance services 715 1.39 
research and development services and related consultancy services 110 0.21 
security, fire-fighting, police and defence equipment 88 0.17 
services related to the oil and gas industry 7 0.01 
sewage-, refuse-, cleaning-, and environmental services 1,046 2.04 
software package and information systems 341 0.66 
supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agencies services 34 0.07 
transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation 775 1.51 
transport services (excl. waste transport) 155 0.3 
total 51384 100 
 Source: PP 
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